Intellectual Virtues: A Closer Look

What is intellectual character? What are intellectual virtues?

By “intellectual character,” we mean, roughly, our character as thinkers and learners. More precisely, we think of intellectual character as a nexus of dispositions to act, think, and feel in particular ways in distinctively epistemic contexts (which may be and often are embedded within wider ethical or civic contexts). And we think of intellectual virtues as “excellences” of intellectual character, including curiosity, open-mindedness, attentiveness, and intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, autonomy, humility, charity, courage, and perseverance (Baehr 2011, 2017). 

How are intellectual virtues related to other kinds of virtues? 

At the most general level, we can think of intellectual virtues as the character strengths of good thinkers and learners, moral virtues as the character strengths of good neighbors, and civic virtues as the character strengths of good citizens (Baehr 2017). While useful in many contexts, this way of distinguishing between intellectual virtues and other kinds of virtues may leave the impression that the former are morally neutral, which in turn may lead to questions about the value of educating for intellectual virtues. Could a highly intellectually virtuous person be morally vicious? If so, are educational efforts that focus exclusively on intellectual character formation worthwhile?

While understandable, we believe these concerns are misplaced. On our view, intellectual virtues overlap with, support, and are constrained by broadly moral or ethical considerations. As such, intellectual character formation is deeply intertwined with and inseparable from moral and civic formation. We offer six brief points in support of this perspective:

1. Intellectual virtues are aimed at genuine epistemic goods. This is part of why they necessarily make us better as persons (Baehr 2025: Ch. 3). Therefore, someone who displays intellectual courage or perseverance in the pursuit of morally nefarious ends, or is curious about trivial or salacious subject matters, would fail to be intellectually virtuous on our view (King 2021: Ch. 2). 
2. What counts as intellectually virtuous activity can be constrained by moral or ethical considerations. For instance, if the acquisition of an epistemic good were to require the perpetration of significant moral harms (e.g. if an important scientific discovery required testing on human subjects without their consent), the pursuit of this good would not be expressive of intellectual virtue on our view. We believe that intellectual virtues operate within certain ethical boundaries and constraints (Baehr 2025: Ch. 3).
3. Intellectual virtues have robust social dimensions and applications (Alfano, de Ridder, and Klein 2022). This is obvious in the case of virtues like open-mindedness or intellectual humility, which often are expressed in an interpersonal context (e.g. when someone listens openly to another person’s perspective or defers to an expert). But it is also true of other intellectual virtues. On our view, all intellectual virtues involve a concern, not only for the agent’s own acquisition of knowledge, but also for the epistemic well-being of others. Thus, a teacher might show curiosity and intellectual carefulness in an effort to help his students understand a difficult subject matter. Or a journalist might exemplify intellectual courage and perseverance as she seeks to discover and share the truth with her readers. Put another way, intellectual virtues necessarily have an “others-regarding” dimension (Baehr 2011: Appendix; Kawall 2002; Roberts and Wood 2007). 
4. Intellectual virtues support and partly constitute important aspects of moral excellence. Acting in a morally responsible way often requires asking thoughtful questions (curiosity), considering multiple perspectives (open-mindedness), and recognizing the limitations of one’s own perspective (intellectual humility). Similarly, according to an ancient and venerable position in virtue ethics, phronesis or good judgment is required for the possession of any moral virtue. Plausibly, such judgment is at least partly a matter of being disposed to think in ways that are careful, thorough, open, fair, honest, courageous, and the like (Baehr 2018). Thus, intellectual virtues are necessary for phronesis.  
5. Intellectual virtues are also central to civic responsibility and virtue. In our own and many other democracies around the world, citizens must be able to navigate an information landscape marked by epistemic silos, misinformation, and AI technologies. This requires, among other things, an exercise of virtues like intellectual carefulness, thoroughness, patience, and perseverance. For democracies to flourish, citizens must also rise above a toxic public discourse and be willing to engage with diverse standpoints in ways that are thoughtful and rational. Virtues like curiosity, open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual courage are critical to this kind of democratic participation. Indeed, especially in our current political situation, many intellectual virtues just are civic virtues (Baehr 2019, 2021). 
6. Intellectual virtues are deeply connected to human flourishing. This is partly because of how they support and overlap with moral excellence. However, for rational beings like us, flourishing also has an inherently epistemic dimension: it involves the cultivation and exercise of our capacities for learning and intellectual growth (Baehr 2025: Ch. 4). As the character strengths required for good thinking and learning, intellectual virtues are an essential means to and partly constitutive of this dimension of human flourishing. Accordingly, if we think of morality as co-extensive with the domain of human flourishing, we can think of intellectual virtues as a subset of moral virtues (Zagzebski 1996).

Why does our project focus on intellectual (vs. moral or civic) virtue formation?

LMU has a strong and longstanding commitment to the broadly ethical and spiritual formation of its students. It currently houses 10 service organizations. In 2016, it was identified by the Princeton Review as one of the top 10 universities for “students most engaged in community service.” The ethical and spiritual formation of LMU students is fostered by the excellent work of several institutes and programs across the university, including the Pam Rector Center for Service and Action, the CSJ Center for Reconciliation and Justice, the Center for Service and Action, the Center for Ignatian Spirituality, the Center for Religion and Spirituality, and the Office of Mission and Ministry. While an Ignatian educational framework also includes a concern with intellectual character formation this emphasis has not been systematically conceptualized or implemented at LMU. Our project is aimed at bringing LMU’s commitment to intellectual character formation into alignment with its current efforts to educate other aspects of the “whole person.” 

Second, we are also prioritizing intellectual virtues because they are the virtues most germane to academic teaching and learning. While it is not impossible for, say, a math or science professor to teach for virtues like kindness, compassion, and respect, it is much easier and more natural for most professors to think about how they might teach for qualities like curiosity, intellectual humility, open-mindedness, and intellectual perseverance. These, again, are the virtues necessary for good thinking and learning. As such, they are part and parcel of ordinary academic activities and aims. Thus, by taking intellectual character formation as our primary emphasis, we hope to secure maximal interest and buy-in from our colleagues and to support LMU’s primary function as an academic institution. 

How are intellectual virtues developed?

We believe the process of developing intellectual virtues is complex. There is no “silver bullet” strategy that guarantees this kind of change. Any successful approach must be multi-pronged. We also believe that the specific demands of intellectual virtue formation can vary depending on factors like developmental stage, natural temperaments and abilities, identities and backgrounds, and the immediate context of the persons involved. While there are general strategies and practices that apply across groups, we believe that any successful attempt to educate for intellectual virtues must be mindful of and tailored to these particularities (Baehr 2021: Ch. 3). 

In terms of strategies and practices, our project will be informed and guided by Jason Baehr’s extensive work on educating for intellectual virtues, which draws on and overlaps with research in educational psychology and character education, including Wake Forest University’s “evidence-based strategies for character development” (Lamb, Brant, and Brooks 2021). In Deep in Thought (2021a), Cultivating Good Minds (2015b), and other work (e.g. 2013, 2016), Baehr lays out a series of “principles, postures, and practices” central to educating for intellectual virtues inside and outside of the classroom. These recommendations are informed by existing empirical research, virtue epistemology, and Baehr’s expansive work in K-12 and post-secondary institutions. Our implementation of them will be guided by LMU’s Ignatian mission and by the needs and backgrounds of LMU students and faculty.